Is the World Really So Gloomy? – Foreign Policy

Emma Ashford: Good morning, Matt! Thank goodness it’s Friday; the last few weeks have been gloomy. Ukraine lost a major battle for the town of Avdiivka; Russian dissident Alexei Navalny died in prison; and Donald Trump carried the South Carolina primary handily and is now the presumptive Republican presidential nominee. Oh, and things in Gaza are going from bad to worse.

I suppose we can at least be grateful that we are not President Joe Biden or his staff. They’re in serious trouble at this point.

Matt Kroenig: Well, let’s put Biden to the side for the moment, but you are right that the broader West is afflicted by feelings of doom and gloom. I just returned from the Munich Security Conference last weekend, and the vibes (that’s what the kids call it, right?) were very different from last year.

In 2023, people were optimistic about Ukraine’s coming spring counteroffensive.

This year, there was a lot of pessimism for all the reasons you mention. I would add that Western leaders were also worried about whether Congress would get its act together and provide additional aid to Ukraine; whether Trump was serious when he said he wouldn’t defend freeloading NATO allies; and whether, if Washington turns its back on Ukraine and NATO, Europe would be able to step up and defend itself.

To make matters worse, Russian President Vladimir Putin wrecked the first morning of the conference with the news that he had killed Navalny.

EA: Let’s start there. Russian authorities claim that Navalny died of “sudden death syndrome,” which isn’t a thing unless you’re an infant. I don’t think we’ll ever know whether his death was ordered or whether it was simply the result of the horrifying mistreatment he received in the Russian prison system and the poisoning he had endured. Either way, though, the Kremlin killed him. And it’s hard to overstate the man’s bravery. Remember, he returned to Russia from the West in 2021 knowing that he would likely be jailed or worse. That took courage—and I’m sure many will be inspired by his willingness to stand up to a brutal regime.

But I do think perhaps Western media is overstating the impact of his death. Navalny never had a broad base of support inside Russia outside of urban professionals and offered symbolism and resistance more than any practical avenue for political change in Russia. So his death is tragic, but I don’t see it as particularly impactful in Russia or abroad.

MK: He did represent the promise of a different kind of political leadership in Moscow and a more pluralistic Russian political system that likely would have been an improvement for most Russians. And effective domestic political regimes can resolve differences through peaceful means. So his death is tragic for him and his family, but also for the state of Russia today.

EA: Again, I think Navalny was more a symbol of resistance than anything else. His own politics were always murky, blurring together nationalist politics with liberal messaging. It’s notable, I think, that he was actually expelled from one of the main Russian liberal parties because of his nationalist views, for example. And it’s worth pointing this out rather than presenting him as some idealized Western liberal figure. I certainly don’t agree with those who argue that all Russians are illiberal warmongers, but the scope of Russian politics is different than in the West, and Navalny wasn’t necessarily liberal, even by Russian standards.

Even as a symbol, though, he helped to send the message that there was opposition to Putin. His death removes that obstacle for the Kremlin and means that most Russian opposition to the regime is now likely to come from expatriate dissidents living outside Russia.

MK: I don’t think anyone thought he was George Washington. Biden and Trump aren’t Washington, either. But at least Americans have a choice and their politicians don’t murder each other—at least not since the Burr-Hamilton duel of 1804!

More broadly, for global geopolitics, his death has implications for relations between Russia and the West. The timing was not accidental. Putin was sending a message on the morning on which he knew Western leaders would be gathering in Munich. He was saying that he can get away with literal murder, and the West is impotent to stop him.

Recall that in June 2021, Biden had threatened that there would be “devastating” consequences if Navalny were to die in captivity. In response to his death, however, Washington only announced some new Russia sanctions, which falls well short of “devastating” in my book.

It was an additional message of defiance against the West from Putin.

EA: Biden was never going to do anything other than sanctions here. Policymakers need to stop making stupid statements like “devastating consequences” when they know that they will not follow through.

I do think you’re reading too much into the timing. Maybe Putin did have him killed to send a message. Or maybe some underling decided it was a good idea. But to be honest, I’m not sure the timing necessarily favors Putin here. If he wants a complacent West, one that is tired of the war in Ukraine and might push for a peace deal, then reminding everyone at Munich of the rotten nature of his regime is a poor tactical choice.

Navalny’s death seems to fit into the broader trend of Western doom and gloom; policymakers are increasingly anxious about the state of the world and pessimistic about their ability to change it. It sounds like that’s what you heard in Munich.

MK: Yes. There was a lot of discussion, including with prominent members of the U.S. Congress present, about whether Congress would be able to pass aid for Ukraine. Sen. J.D. Vance unapologetically argued that it was not a U.S. interest and that Europe should take care of it. Almost all the other members tried to reassure a skeptical European audience that the aid would get through quickly.

There were also a lot of worries about what a Trump 2.0 administration would mean for European security, especially in the wake of Trump’s comments about the United States no longer defending freeloading NATO allies.

EA: It’s absolutely astounding to me that this is coming as a surprise to European policymakers. And I say this as someone who has spent years trying to explain to European policymakers that public support in the United States for continuing to fund European defense while states in the region do little is weak and is likely to fail at some point.

The dynamics that we are seeing in Congress and the presidential race today have been visible for a long time. Yet European leaders are only now considering what would happen if the United States pulled back? It’s complete and utter malpractice by elites in these countries that they didn’t start preparing 10 years ago.

MK: NATO allies have been spending more on defense since the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine. At the time, only a handful of allies were spending at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense. That number is expected to rise to 18 this year. But that still means that more than one-third of NATO allies are not meeting their defense commitments.

So there is movement in the right direction, but it is not enough.

Several European leaders seemed to get the message. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said that 2 percent is “can only be the start of it” and Germany may need to spend up to 3.5 percent depending on what happens in the world. British Shadow Secretary of State David Lammy also said he understood U.S. complaints and that the U.K. was open to a serious discussion about more equitable burden sharing.

But I learned a startling fact during these discussions. U.S. defense spending still makes up two-thirds of the NATO total, and more than 80 percent of NATO defense spending comes from countries outside of the EU (Norway, Turkey, the U.K., Canada, etc.).

The idea of EU strategic autonomy on defense is just not feasible given these realities.

EA: Sorry, I was laughing too hard at the idea of Germany voluntarily spending 3.5 percent of its GDP on defense. Today’s German policymakers are much more cautious and unwilling to spend than their Cold War counterparts. It’s probably necessary, but I have a hard time seeing it happening.

It’s true that there has been progress among NATO allies in spending, albeit slow and uneven. But to be honest, it really is time to move past the 2 percent of GDP metric in these discussions. That was a useful metric when the question was about how we measure whether states are spending enough on defense. But it isn’t the same as answering the question of whether Europe can defend itself without the United States.

There have been some good academic and policy papers looking at this question in recent years, particularly a debate between MIT professor Barry Posen—who argues that Europe can indeed defend itself—and scholars at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, who argue that it would take 15 years or more to build a coherent defense.

But in a nutshell, European states are more than wealthy, populous, and technologically advanced enough to build up their own militaries. The problems are divergent threat perceptions by states across Europe, different levels of willingness to spend on the problem, and political willpower.

Just look at the criticisms leveled by Eastern European leaders at German policymakers as living “in an illusion” this week. I believe these divisions can be overcome with the right push, and perhaps at least a partial U.S. drawdown is what is needed to force the issue and speed this transition up.

MK: Many criticize Trump’s political rhetoric, but his tough talk on NATO burden sharing prodded Europeans to spend more in his first term, and it seems that his latest statements are having a similar effect.

As one European diplomat explained to me, meeting the NATO 2 percent spending threshold now has three purposes. One, it is the right thing to do. Two, it allows a country to tell a future President Trump that they are not freeloaders and are worthy of protection. Three, if, in the unlikely event, America turns its back on Europe, they are better able to defend themselves.

So, the whining over Trump’s political rhetoric is one area where the doom and gloom is misplaced.

EA: As an aside, incidentally, I think this is probably why anyone who hopes that Trump will abandon Europe (i.e., Putin) may end up disappointed. Trump has shown himself to be very easily persuaded by flattery and political arguments. Remember the Fort Trump controversy? And there was also commentary recently from former Trump official Keith Kellogg, who argued that perhaps Trump would only defend those states that did meet the 2 percent of GDP threshold, which would mean we’d still defend Eastern Europe, but not Western Europe? Since Eastern Europe is closer to Russia, I suppose that wouldn’t change anything on the ground. A rather confusing attempt to rationalize Trump’s erratic views, I thought.

MK: Well, if I stopped paying dues at our country club, I would not expect continued access. European defense should be treated with at least as much seriousness as tennis.

EA: I hope you don’t bring your understanding of deterrence to the tennis court, Matt. It would be less “love-all” and more nuclear volleys.

MK: Touché. Several senior European diplomats said that Trump’s policies were beneficial for Europe’s eastern flank and cited the provision of Javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine (remember, the Obama administration refused to provide lethal aid) and an expanded U.S. troop presence in Poland as examples.

And I agree with you that European nations are wealthy enough to provide the nuts and bolts of a conventional defense in Europe: tanks, aircraft, personnel, etc. But only the United States can provide the higher-end capabilities and enablers. Nuclear deterrence, for example, should remain a U.S. responsibility, and some of the recent talk about a French or even German nuclear umbrella for Europe does not make much sense.

EA: Well, French President Emmanuel Macron is not making any friends at the moment. He told journalists early this week that he would not rule out sending NATO troops into Ukraine, prompting an absolute firestorm of responses, including from German and Italian leaders, who pointed out that nothing has changed in the consensus among most European states that NATO should not fight directly in Ukraine.

The French leader seems to float in the wind when it comes to foreign policy and “strategic autonomy,” so perhaps it’s no surprise that Eastern European states would worry about whether they could truly trust a French nuclear umbrella.

For all the doom and gloom you report from Munich, though, it sounds to me like maybe, finally, European states are starting to get serious on defense. From my point of view, that can only be a good thing.

MK: I don’t know why Macron thought that proposing NATO ground forces in Ukraine would be a welcome idea. It brings to mind the posters from the war on terror era that said “France, you shut the hell up. We’ll protect civilization.”

EA: And yet, despite all the rhetoric—and the Freedom Fries—the French and the Germans (and even the Russians) were broadly correct back then. Turns out invading Iraq really was a bad idea! And if Europe is going to pull together on defense, it will need the French to take a leading role. Perhaps, though, we could all agree to keep Macron away from the microphones for a while?

MK: That is one policy we can agree on: Taisez-vous, Manu.